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DISPLACEMENT OF STATE RULES OF DECISION
IN CONSTRUING RELEASES OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
Courts have failed to develop a coherent body of law to determine whether state or federal rules of decision' should govern
releases2 of federal claims. Automatic application of state contract
I Rules of decision are "the laws which are applied by courts to determine the questions brought before them." Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428,
1428 n.6 (1960). State common law and federal common law are each an aggregation of
rules of decision.
The problem of choosing rules of decision arises only after the resolution of a choiceof-law question under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and the first branch of
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See notes 37-54 and accompanying text infra. Concluding whether state or federal law governs under Erie and Clearfeld
determines only whether the state courts or the federal courts have the competence to
choose rules of decision for the case at hand. See id. If federal law governs, the federal
court may still choose state rules of decision. See note 54 infra. See generally Mishkin, The
Variousness of "FederalLaw": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules
for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957); Comment, FederalJudicial Law-Making Power:
Competence as a Function of Cognizable Federal Interests, 18 B.C. INDUS. & Com. L. REv. 171
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Federal Law-Making Power]; Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1512 (1969); Note, The Competence of Federal Courts To Formulate
Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1084 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Note, Federal Competence]; Comment, Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43 U.
CHi. L. REv. 823 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Adopting State Law].
It is clear that federal law governs releases of federal claims. See notes 46-50 and
accompanying text infra. Releases exemplify the problem-faced by all federal courts adjudicating federal claims intertwined with common-law issues-of choosing between state
and federal rules of decision. This choice is the focus of this Note. See notes 55-61 and
accompanying text infra.
2 Included in the term "release," as used in this Note, is the "covenant not to sue."
Both are contracts. A covenant not to sue is an agreement not to enforce a right of action;
a release is an agreement that surrenders a right of action. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 301, 303 (4th ed. 1971). The existence of a release is an affirmative
defense under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Breach of a
covenant not to sue gives rise to a counterclaim, entitling the defendant to damages but
not barring the primary action. Artvale, Inc. v. Rugby Fabrics Corp., 232 F. Supp. 814,
821 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 363 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1966). Many courts, however, have
allowed parties to plead a covenant not to sue as a defense. See, e.g., Caplan v. City of
Pittsburgh, 375 Pa. 268, 272, 100 A.2d 380, 383 (1953). These courts have treated the
covenant not to sue as though it destroyed the right of action. This approach, although
analytically imprecise, is no more so than the label "covenant not to sue" itself. Some courts
have treated as a covenant not to sue a document dearly in the form of a release, contemplating the surrender of a claim as to certain parties yet explicitly reserving rights against
other parties. See W. PROSSER, supra, § 49, at 303-04. The "covenant not to sue" label
served to give effect to the reservation of rights, since under the common-law jointtortfeasor rule a release of one joint tortfeasor released them all, irrespective of the contracting parties' intentions. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text infra.
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law to agreements releasing federal claims 3 could subvert federal
policies underlying those claims. Yet the general application of
federal common law could threaten legitimate state concerns, the
interests of the contracting parties, and the vitality of federalism.
To strike an appropriate state-federal balance, commentators have
suggested that state rules should govern except where important
federal policy or the need for nationwide uniformity dictates resort
to federal common law. 4 This analysis, however, requires further
refinement. Courts should displace state law in varying degrees,
depending on whether the primacy of federal policy or the need
for uniformity dictates application of federal rules of decision. This
Note will examine the displacement of state rules of decision in the
context of releases of federal claims.
I
CASES CONSTRUING RELEASES OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

Analysis of the confusion surrounding the choice of decisional
rules for releases of federal claims must begin with two pairs of
Supreme Court cases. The first comprises Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co. 5 and Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad.6 In 1942,
Garrett adopted a federal rule of decision for allocating the burden of proving duress in a dispute over a seaman's release of an
admiralty claim. 7 Ten years later, Dice formulated a federal rule of
decision to determine whether a plaintiff who negligently released
a Federal Employers' Liability Act 8 (FELA) claim could protest the
defendant's fraud in inducing the release. 9 Each decision voided a
release that a state's highest court had upheld.' 0 The two opinions
The significance of these tortured distinctions is that the choice between state and
federal rules of decision for labeling a given agreement either a release or a covenant not
to sue may well determine the outcome of a case. See, e.g., Ayers v. Pastime Amusement
Co., 259 F. Supp. 358, 361-62 (D.S.C. 1966); Dale Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle Publications,
Inc., 198 F. Supp. 638, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
' As used in this Note, "federal claim" designates a claim arising under federal law.
For a discussion of the cases construing releases of federal claims, see notes 5-36 and
accompanying text infra.
4 See Note, The Federal Common Law, supra note 1, at 1517-31. See also Comment, Federal
Law-Making Power, supra note 1, at 176; Note, Federal Competence, supra note 1, at 1097-99.
But cf. Comment, Adopting State Law, supra note 1 (proposing decrease in emphasis on need
for uniformity).
5 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
6 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
7 317 U.S. at 243-45.
O 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
'342 U.S. at 361.
"0See Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 155 Ohio St. 185, 98 N.E.2d 301 (1951) (legal effect
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stressed the need for nationally uniform standards defining federal
plaintiffs' rights." Garrett also noted the special protection traditionally accorded seamen as "wards" of the admiralty (i.e., federal)
courts. 1 2 Dice took the position that the FELA granted claimants a
right not only to recover but to recover under a "federally declared
standard."' 3
The second pair of Supreme Court cases adopted a federal
rule of decision to govern a release's effect on joint tortfeasors.
Because the common law regarded a cause of action as indivisible,' 4 potential plaintiffs who released one of several joint tortfeasors automatically released them all.' 5 In Aro Manufacturing Co.
v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. 16 the Supreme Court refused to
apply the common-law rule to the release of a patent infringement
claim.' 7 Subsequently, in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc. ,18 the Court rejected the old joint-tortfeasor rule for antitrust
claims, holding that the parties' intent determined the scope of a
release. 19 The Supreme Court evidently assumed that federal rules
applied,2 0 for neither opinion touched on the question of applicable rules of decision.
The Garrett-Dice and Aro-Zenith lines of decision have received
narrow application. Citing Garrett and Dice, courts now routinely
apply federal common law to all aspects of seamen's admiralty
releases2 ' and, after further prodding by the Supreme Court,2 2 to

of release of FELA claim executed in Ohio should be determined in Ohio courts by Ohio
law), rev'd, 342 U.S. 359 (1952); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 344 Pa. 69, 23 A.2d
503 (evidence not sufficient to declare release invalid on grounds of fraud, duress, or
mistake), rev'd, 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
11Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. at 361; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317
U.S. at 244.
12 317 U.S. at 246-48.
13342 U.S. at 361.
14W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 49, at 301 & n.93.
1 The release applied to all joint tortfeasors even when it took the form of a written
instrument expressly reserving rights against some of them. Id. at 301-02. Some courts,
however, interpreted such a release as a covenant not to sue, which could serve as a defense or counterclaim only for the covenantee. See note 2 supra.
16377 U.S. 476 (1964).
17 d. at 500-02.
18401 U.S. 321 (1971).
19
Id. at 346-47.
20 So it has appeared to at least two judges. See Virginia Impression Prods. Co. v. SCM
Corp., 448 F.2d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936
(1972); Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 374 F. Supp. 620, 624 (W.D. Pa.
1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1975).
21See, e.g., Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1123 (5th Cir. 1976); Lewis v. Texaco,
Inc., 527 F.2d 921, 923-25 (2d Cir. 1975). Ukider Garrett, federal rules also govern releases
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FELA releases as well.2 3 But when construing releases of other
federal claims, courts have generally declined to invoke Garrett or
Dice.2 4 Courts have relied on Aro and Zenith to abolish the common-law joint-tortfeasor rule for all federal causes of action,25 but
have not read those cases as requiring application of federal rules
by longshoremen, who, like seamen, are considered wards of admiralty. See Robertson v.
Douglas S.S. Co., 510 F.2d 829, 834-35 (5th Cir. 1975); Wooten v. Skibs a/s Samuel Bakke,
431 F.2d 821, 823 (4th Cir. 1970). See also Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-945, 947-950 (1970). But cf. Capotorto v. Compania Sud
Americana de Vapores, Chilean Line, Inc., 541 F.2d 985, 987 (2d Cir. 1976) (court refused
to treat longshoreman as ward of admiralty, not specifying whether some other federal
standard governed); Harris v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (E.D. Tex.
1974) (same). Yet a district court ignored Garrett and applied state rules of decision to a
release of a claim under the Death on the High Seas Act (46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1970)).
Krause v. Sud-Aviation, Societe Nationale de Constructions Aeronautiques, 301 F. Supp.
513, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Apparently the factor that triggers application of fedefal rules is
not the maritime nature of the cause of action but rather the need to protect a "ward" of
the admiralty courts.
22 See Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry., 365,U.S. 160 (1961) (federal rule governs FELA
release challenged for lack of consideration), rev'g 251 N.C. 783, 112 S.E.2d 249 (1960).
22
E.g., Taylor v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 518 F.2d 536, 537 (4th Cir. 1975); Fournier v.
Canadian Pac. R.R., 512 F.2d 317, 318 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam). But see Bafico v. Southern Pac. Co., 364 F.2d 36, 37-38 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1025 (1967).
24 See Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 892-93 (3d Cir.
1975); Virginia Impression Prods. Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262, 265-66 (4th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972); Eagle Lion Films, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 219 F.2d 196, 198
(2d Cir. 1955); Duffy Theatres, Inc. v. Griffith Consol. Theatres, Inc., 208 F.2d 316, 324
(10th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954). See also Schott Enterprises, Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., 520 F.2d 1298, 1300 (6th Cir. 1975).
The Ninth Circuit, however, has cited Dice as authority for the application of federal
common law to an antitrust release. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Winchester
Drive-In Theatre, Inc., 351 F.2d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011
(1966). Although the case was wrongly decided (see note 59 and accompanying text infra),
the Fifth Circuit followed Twentieth Century-Fox in another antitrust case. Miami Parts &
Spring, Inc. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 402 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam). The
Third Circuit, in Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 181, 183-84 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd, 287 F.2d 448 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 930 (1961), also applied federal rules to
an antitrust release on the authority of Dice, but it has since changed its mind. See Three
Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 892-93 (3d Cir. 1975) (applying state
rules of decision in antitrust case with only passing mention of Dice). The Sixth Circuit,
citing Dice, held that a federal rule of decision governed the issue of fraud in the release of
an age discrimination claim. Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367, 1368-69 (6th Cir.
1975).
25
See Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1971) (rejecting commonlaw rule as to release of admiralty claim on authority of Zenith); Billiot v. Sewart Seacraft,
Inc., 382 F.2d 662, 664 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967) (rejecting common-law rule as to release of
admiralty claim on authority of Aro). See also Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
522 F.2d 885, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1975) (interpreting Zenith as adopting "a uniform national
rule to govern the effect of a release on co-defendants in other states") (emphasis added);
Wiederhold v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 368 F. Supp. 1054, 1058-60 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (rejecting
common-law rule as to release of FELA claim, citing but not exclusively relying on Zenith).
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to other aspects of releases.2 6 Thus, Garrett and Dice require application of federal rules to all aspects of contracts releasing certain
federal claims (the vertical bars on the chart below), while Aro and
Zenith establish a federal rule governing one aspect of releases of
all federal claims (the horizontal bar on the chart below). This
pattern rests on no discernible principles of reason.
WHERE FEDERAL RULES GOVERN RELEASES OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
Nature of Claim
* -5

fraud

-S

fairness
effect on joint
tortfeasors

•'

consideration
.

('.

-

*

*

etc.

As to releases of most federal claims-those not arising under
the FELA or admiralty law, nor involving the release's effect on
joint tortfeasors-which rules of decision to apply remains an open
question.2 7 Some opinions cite state cases, as though there were no
26

See, e.g., Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 888-91 (3d Cir.
1975); Virginia Impression Prods. Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262, 265-66 (4th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972).
27 The problem arises only where Congress has neither specified the applicable rules
of decision nor indicated what law should supply them. See Comment, Adopting State Law,
supra note 1, at 824-27. For example, state rules of decision govern releases of tort claims
against the federal government because the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2672 (1970)) provides for government liability "under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the [tort] occurred." Id. § 1346(b). See United States Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 470 F.2d 487, 489-90 (5th Cir. 1972); Scoggin v. United States, 444 F.2d 74, 75
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28
question but that state rules of decision govern. 8 Other decisions
summarily hold that federal rules apply.2 9 Some courts refer to
30
both state and federal rules where they yield the same result,
while other courts cite no cases at all. 3 ' It appears that counsel
often fail to spot the issue or to perceive how the choice between
state and federal rules of decision might determine the outcome of
litigation.3 2 Judges may be reluctant to raise such a complex issue
on their own,33 and many have legitimately avoided it by refusing
to enforce a release that would have contravened federal statutory
policy.3 4 Cases that explicitly find a release to comport with federal

(10th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Bacon v. United States, 321 F.2d 880, 885 (8th Cir. 1963);
Montellier v. United States, 315 F.2d 180, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1963); Robinson v. United
States, 408 F. Supp. 132, 136 (N.D. Ill. 1976). But cf. Garrett v. Jeffcoat, 483 F.2d 590,
592-93 (4th Cir. 1973) (state rule that releasing servant releases master inapplicable to
master such as United States, held exclusively liable for servants' negligent driving under
Federal Drivers Act); Munson v. United States, 380 F.2d 976, 979-80 (6th Cir. 1967) (state
rule that releasing servant releases master inapplicable to master such as United States,
which could not seek indemnity from its servant). See also Mishkin, supra note 1, at 797 &
n.1, 811.
28
E.g., Clapper v. Original Tractor Cab Co., 270 F.2d 616, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 967 (1960); Eagle Lion Films, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 219 F.2d 196, 198 (2d
Cir. 1955). See Note, The Role of State Law in Federal Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1398 (1962). See also Bafico v. Southern Pac. Co., 364 F.2d 36, 37-38
(9th Cir. 1966) (state law applied without explanation in FELA case), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
102529(1967).
E.g., Clark v. Ziedonis, 513 F.2d 79, 81 (7th Cir. 1975); Barninger v. National
Maritime Union, 372 F. Supp. 908, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
"0 E.g., Dura Elec. Lamp Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 249 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir.
1957). The Second Circuit for a time chose "to ignore the usually-theoretical question of
what law governs and to draw precedents from both federal and state... courts." Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956)
(dictum).
31
E.g., Kershaw v. Kershaw Mfg. Co., 209 F. Supp. 447, 455 (M.D. Ala. 1962), affd
per curiam, 327 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1964).
32 It is obvious that the choice of a rule of decision may be outcome-determinative
where the federal rule differs from the state rule. But even where the federal and state
rules are the same, litigants facing probable defeat can argue that a federal rule should
govern and that the federal court should change the existing federal rule. See, e.g., Miree
v. United States, 538 F.2d 643, 645, 648 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (dissenting opinion),
vacated sub nom. Miree v. DeKaIb County, 97 S. Ct. 2490 (1977).
3
See, e.g., Baker v. Chicago, Fire & Burglary Detection, Inc., 489 F.2d 953, 955 n.4
(7th Cir. 1973) (court applied Illinois law because both parties cited it).
34 Completely apart from the choice-of-law issue, a release-like any other contract
-may be void as against public policy. Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 372 F.
Supp. 821, 834-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The Supreme Court has specifically held: "[A] statutory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived
or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy." Brooklyn Say. Bank
v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945) (Fair Labor Standards Act). Accord, Redel's Inc. v.
General Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 99 (5th Cir. 1974) (Clayton Act); Chastang v. Flynn &
Emrich Co., 365 F. Supp. 957, 968 (D. Md. 1973) (Civil Rights Act of 1964); Buford v.
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statutory policy have tended to follow state rules of decision in
resolving any further questions about the release. 35 Only a few
36
decisions have confronted the problem head-on.
II
AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

A. Background
Under the doctrine of Erie Railroadv. Tompkins,37 the interpretation of a release is a substantive matter subject to the same law in
both state and federal court.3 8 But to which law? Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States3 9 set the stage for answering this question. 40 ClearAmerican Fin. Co.,. 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1248-49 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (Truth in Lending Act);
Cohen v. Tenney Corp., 318 F. Supp. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Securities Exchange Acts).
35
See, e.g., Virginia Impression Prods. Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262, 265-66 (4th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972); Duffy Theatres, Inc. v. Griffith Consol.
Theatres, Inc., 208 F.2d 316, 324 (10th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954);
Suckow Borax Mines Consol., Inc. v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 185 F.2d 196, 206-07 (9th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951); Marketing Assistance Plan, Inc. v. Associated Milk
Prod., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1019, 1022-23 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
36 E.g., Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 888-93 (3d Cir.
1975) (Forman, J.) (see notes 83-96 and accompanying text infra); Novak v. General Elec.
Corp., 282 F. Supp. 1010, 1013-19 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (Higginbotham, J.); Artvale, Inc. v.
Rugby Fabrics Corp., 232 F. Supp. 814, 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (Levet, J.), aff'd, 363 F.2d
1002 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.); Winchester Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Co., 232 F. Supp. 556, 560-61 (N.D. Cal. 1964) (Zirpoli, J.), rev'd, 351
F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1965) (Barnes, J.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
37 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
38 Erie sets standards for determining whether the same law must govern in both state
and federal court (in which case the issue is "substantive") or whether each court may
apply its own law (in which case the issue is "procedural"). An issue is substantive if the
application of different decisional rules in state and federal court would induce forum
shopping or deny litigants equal protection of the laws. See id. at 74-78. An issue is substantive as well if either the state or federal government has an overwhelming interest in seeing
its own law govern. See id. at 78-80. Where no reason exists to apply the same law in both
state and federal court, or where such reasons are outweighed by the interest of a forum
court per se in applying its own law, state law governs in state court and federal law in
federal court. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965) (interest of forum
court in applying own rules of civil procedure).
Since the outcome of litigation will often hinge on the effect given to a release, different rules of decision governing releases in state and federal courts will induce forum shopping. Moreover, the weight of the arguments in favor of state or federal rules of decisionhowever closely balanced-does not vary from forum to forum; in other words, a forum
court faced with a release problem has almost no interest in applying its own law to releases just because it is the forum court. The interpretation of a release is therefore a
substantive matter.
39 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
40
See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
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field involved the affirmative defense of laches rather than release, 4 ' but the choice-of-law problem is similar.4 2 The Supreme
Court posed two questions, each to be answered by balancing state
and federal interests. The first was whether state or federal law
controlled.43 Since the Court decided that federal law applied, 44 it
reached the second question: whether federal law would draw its
rules of decision from state law or from federal common law. 4 5
The chart below illustrates the sequence of choices that Erie and
Clearfield impose.
ERIE-CLEARFIELD

PROCEDURAL
(state or federal
court applies on

DECISION TREE

SUBSTANTIVE
(same T
s in
state and federal court)

STATE LAW
applies in all courts

STATE LAW defines
federal rules of decision

FEDERAL LAW
applies in all courts

FEDERAL COMMON LAW
CLEARFIELD
II
defines federal rules of decision

N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964); Mishkin, supra note 1; Note, The Federal Common Law, supra
note 1; Note, Federal Competence, supra note 1; Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69
YALE L.J. 1428 (1960).
41 318 U.S. at 366.
42 The defense of release, however, arises not out of inaction but out of some act al-

leged to constitute the surrender of a claim. A release agreement may stipulate or imply
which law is to govern.
43 318 U.S. at 366-67.
The principal legal question in Erie was whether the issue at hand was substantive or
procedural. See note 38 supra. In deciding that the issue was substantive, the Court relied in
part on the importance to the state of having its own law govern in both state and federal
courts. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938). It was thus obvious in Erie that
state law would control. In contrast, the question of controlling law in Clearfield was sufficiently close to warrant explicit treatment. Therefore, in this Note the question of controlling law is referred to as Clearfield's first balancing test.
44 318 U.S. at 366-67.
45 Id. at 367. For a closer examination of this double-balancing test, see note 54 infra.
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Clearfield's first determination-that federal law controls-does
no more than establish a federal court's competence to choose rules
of decision. 4 6 The Rules of Decision Act 47 confers such competence
wherever "the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts
of Congress... require or provide. '4 8 All federal claims, by definition, fall within the sweep of a constitutional grant of power to the
federal government. Defenses to federal claims, such as release or
laches, are sufficiently intertwined with the claims themselves to
enter the realm of federal competence as well.4 9 Federal courts
thus have the power to choose rules of decision for all releases of
federal claims. 50
This federal competence indicates only a potential federal interest in the application of distinct federal rules of decision (i.e.,
federal common law). Although relieved of constitutional or statutory5 ' commands to follow state law, 52 federal courts 53 may still
54
apply state rules of decision.
46 Mishkin, supra note 1, at 802. See generally Comment, Federal Law-Making Power,
supra note 1; Note, Federal Competence, supra note 1.
47 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970).
48

Id.

49 See Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1952). See also Brooklyn Say.

Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945).
50 Mishkin, supra note 1, at 799. See generally Comment, Federal Law-Making Power,
supra note 1; Note, Federal Competence, supra note 1.
51 Commentators dispute whether Erie rests primarily on the Constitution or the Rules
of Decision Act. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 56 (3d ed.
1976) and conflicting authorities cited therein.
52
"[U]nder Erie R. R. v. Tompkins [i.e., Clearfield's first balancing test (see note 43 and
accompanying text supra)] ... we are bound to follow state law, whether or not we agree
with the reasoning upon which it is based or the outcome which it dictates. This is the
ultimate significance of the Erie decision." Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975). When Clearfeld's
first balancing test swings to state law, even the Supreme Court of the United States must
accept that law as interpreted by the state's highest court. E.g., Hortonville Joint School
Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976).
5' State courts adjudicating federal claims must apply whatever rules of decision the
local federal court would apply. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
54 CleaTfield's double-balancing test might seem unnecessary. Why would a court hold
that federal law controlled a given issue and then decide the issue according to state law?
The court could accomplish the same result through a single balancing of interests in
which those of the state prevailed. However, the double-balancing test does serve to distinguish cases such as Erie in which state law governs of its own force (i.e., by prevailing in the
first test) and hence binds the federal courts (see note 52 supra) from those in which state
law governs by incorporation into federal law (i.e., by prevailing in the second test) at the
option of federal courts. Note, Federal Competence, supra note 1, at 1099. This distinction is
not always sharp nor of great practical importance. See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382
U.S. 341, 357 (1966) ("it is unnecessary to decide in the present case whether the Texas
law.., should apply ex proprio vigore . . . or by 'adoption' as a federal principle" because "it
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B.

Displacement of State Rules of Decision
To determine whether state or federal rules of decision should
govern under Clearfield's second balancing test, commentators have
urged a presumption in favor of state rules that can be overridden
by the need to foster federal policy or to impose nationwide
uniformity. 55 Courts, however, have failed to recognize that the
extent of displacement of state law can and should vary depending
on whether uniformity or federal policy justifies application of
federal rules.
Two principles follow from the presumption in favor of state
rules of decision. First, the greater the displacement of state rules
required by the promotion of a federal interest, the more important that interest should be. Second, when courts apply federal
common law, they should do so in the manner that least disrupts
state law.
Promoting federal policy 56 requires courts to void releases of
federal claims 57 under certain circumstances. 5 8 But federal rules
should not unnecessarily displace state rules. Therefore, in the
absence of an overriding need for uniformity, federal rules should
merely define minimum federal standards. State rules limiting the
effect of releases of federal claims to a greater degree than federal
rules of decision should be allowed to operate. 5 9 Reliance on overis clear that the state rule should govern"). But see Note, Federal Competence, supra note 1, at
1099 (arguing that reason for applying state rule can affect precedential value of decision).
Nevertheless, the Court returned to the double-balancing approach in United States v.
Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593-94 (1973).
"' See authorities cited in note 4 supra.
56 Examples of federal policies are the protection of seamen (see Garrett v. MooreMcCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942)) and private enforcement of the antitrust laws (see
note 79 and accompanying text infra).
57 Federal policy may also demand that releases be allowed to operate, in order to
facilitate settlement. See, e.g., Suckow Borax Mines Consol., Inc. v. Borax Consol., Ltd., 185
F.2d 196, 206-07 (9th Cir. 1950) (by implication). However, settlements are best promoted
by preventing the overly broad or capricious operation of releases, which might discourage
their use. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 346-47 (1971)
(rejecting common-law joint-tortfeasor rule in part because it impeded settlement of
claims).
58For example, the federal policy of protecting railroad workers demonstrates governmental interest in preventing a worker's release from operating when obtained by
fraud, even when he is negligent in signing it. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359,
361 (1952).
59This would avoid the absurd results of cases like Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.
v. Winchester Drive-In Theatre, Inc., 351 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1965) (antitrust claim), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966), and Canillas v. Joseph H. Carter, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 48
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (seaman's admiralty claim). In these cases, the application of federal common law served to validate releases that state law would probably not have recognized, thus
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riding federal policy permits only a veto of objectionable state rules
of decision. Courts should exercise this veto only when state rules

accord greater deference to releases of federal claims than federal
policy can tolerate.

In contrast to this circumscribed veto designed to foster federal policy, a federal interest in nationally uniform rules of decision

requires the complete displacement of state rules of decision; national uniformity, by definition, requires that all state rules yield to
a single federal standard. Where the court finds a need for nationally uniform treatment of releases of a certain type of federal
claim, the mere veto of particular state rules will not suffice.
Rather, the court must substitute federal rules for all state rules as
60
to all aspects of releases of such claims.
When a court opts for a nationally uniform rule, the next
question is what that rule should be. Where an overriding federal
policy is present, the court should tailor its uniform rule to best
effectuate that policy. Absent an overriding federal policy, the
court could cushion the complete displacement of state rules by

61
declaring the national rule to be that of the majority of states.

Even then, however, the displacement of state rules due to the

imposition of nationwide uniformity would vastly exceed that required by the fostering of federal policy. Therefore, courts should
be particularly reluctant to recognize a need for uniformity.
depriving plaintiffs of their federal claims. Moreover, Twentieth Century-Fox and Canillas
adopted a rule of decision-the joint-tortfeasor rule of the first Restatement of Torts (see
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 885(1) (1939))-that the Supreme Court repudiated shortly
thereafter as contrary to federal interests. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 346-47 (1971); notes 14-20 and accompanying text supra. See also Miree
v. United States, 538 F.2d 643, 647-48 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (dissenting opinion, Morgan, J.) (criticizing majority for invoking federal common law because of federal interest in
promoting air safety and then formulating rule of decision contrary to that interest), vacated sub nom. Miree v. DeKaIb County, 97 S. Ct. 2490 (1977).
60 In theory, a court might find the need for nationally uniform rules of decision as to
only one aspect of a release. This position is illogical, however, because the reasons for
adopting nationwide uniformity (such as the desirability of having identical acts by parties
lead to identical consequences in all fifty states) apply with equal force to all aspects of
releases. Courts have implicitly recognized this proposition. See, e.g., Taylor v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 518 F.2d 536, 537 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1975) (applying nationally uniform rule for
mutual mistake in release of FELA claim, citing as authority case applying nationally uniform rule for fraud in release of FELA claim).
61 A trivial concession to the states, this approach might actually subvert the federal
system by promoting conformity among the states and discouraging the evolution of the
common law. But cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938) (application of federal
rules of decision to state-created rights since early nineteenth century did not induce state
law to conform to federal law).
For some criteria for choosing the federal rule most compatible with state law, see
Wiederhold v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 368 F. Supp. 1054, 1057-58 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
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III
THE CASES REVISITED

In light of these principles, the Supreme Court's opinions construing releases of federal claims have generally applied the correct
rules of decision. The Court's holdings, however, have been unnecessarily broad. The Court has bloated the federal rules' sphere
of operation and diminished that of state rules-all to the detriment
of federalism. Lower courts should therefore utilize the Court's
decisions for the concerns they reflect rather than the rules they
propound.
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co. 62 comports with the principles
developed above. Garrett held that federal rules govern all aspects
of seamen's releases of admiralty claims due to the seaman's traditional status as ward of the admiralty 63 and the need for nationally
uniform rules. 64 The seaman's status as ward of the admiralty
translates into a federal policy of protecting seamen. Since a federal policy interest requires veto only of state rules contravening
that policy, 65 Garrett's holding that federal rules control all aspects
of all admiralty releases must stand, if at all, on the need for nationally uniform rules. Although that need seldom justifies the
complete displacement of state rules, 66 admiralty cases are the exception. The tendency to treat seamen as virtually incompetent 67 so
pervades the law of releases and so constricts their operation that
applying state rules subject to federal veto would seldom allow state
rules to operate at all. 6" Moreover, uniform rules regarding seamen's releases are attainable because they, or the principles from
which they derive, already exist. 69 Nationally uniform rules are
thus appropriate in the case of admiralty releases.
Under the FELA, however, uniform rules would displace state
rules to a greater extent than federal interests require. Hence Dice
62317 U.S. 239 (1942). See text accompanying notes 5-13 supra.
63 317 U.S. at 246-48.

64 Id. at 244.
65 See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
66 See notes 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
67 Seamen "are emphatically the -wards of the admiralty; and though not technically
incapable of entering into a valid contract, they are treated in the same manner as courts
of equity are accustomed to treat young heirs, dealing with their expectancies, wards with
their guardians, and cestuis que trustent with their trustees." Garrett v. Moore-McCormack
Co., 317 U.S. 239, 246 (1942) (quoting Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C.D. Me.
1823) (No. 6047) (Story, J.)).
68 See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 2S9, 248 (1942).
6

9See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-16 (2d ed. 1975).
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v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad,7 0 in decreeing that federal
rules govern FELA releases, held too broadly. In Dice, representatives of the employer railroad deliberately misled an injured employee, who then signed a release without reading itZ 1 Under state
law, the worker's negligent failure to read the release prevented
him from protesting his employer's fraud.7 2 This the Supreme
Court would not countenance: "Application of so harsh a rule to
defeat a railroad employee's claim is wholly incongruous with the
general policy of the [FELA] to give railroad employees a right to
recover . . ... 7 The Court's principal concern was to avoid the
operation of a particular rule of decision 74 because the result
would contravene the FELA's policy of protecting railroad workers. This concern in no way required the broad holding that followed: "[V]alidity of releases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act .... must constantly be determined in these cases according
to a uniform federal law."' 75 Having failed to demonstrate the need
for nationwide uniformity, the Court erred in exercising76 rulemaking rather than veto power to implement federal policy.
The Court repeated this mistake in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. ,77 an antitrust action that enunciated a federal
rule to govern the effect of a release on joint tortfeasors. 8 Private
79
enforcement of the antitrust laws was the federal policy at stake.
Although releases do not in themselves contravene this policy,80
forcing wrongdoers to bargain for their releases and thus pay a
"fine" is implicit in the private attorney general system. The
common-law joint-tortfeasor rule rejected in Zenith would have
70 342

U.S. 359 (1952). See text accompanying notes 5-13 supra.

71 342 U.S. at 360.
72

Id. at 360-61.
Id. at 362.
74 The Court admitted that the "Ohio rule [was] out of harmony with modern judicial
and legislative practice." Id.
75
Id. at 361-62.
7
1See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
7 401 U.S. 321 (1971). See text accompanying notes 14-20 supra.
73

78 401 U.S. at 346.
79

See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969). In
recent years, the Supreme Court has been less hospitable to this private attorney general
concept. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86
(1977). See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (narrowing standing
under securities laws).
80 Richard's Lumber & Supply Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 545 F.2d 18, 20 (7th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977); Schott Enterprises, Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., 520
F.2d 1298, 1300 (6th Cir. 1975); Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d
885, 891-92 (3d Cir. 1975).
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subverted federal policy by releasing tortfeasors who never bargained. Zenith's holding that a release may operate on nonparties
only where the parties so intend 8' increases the likelihood that
wrongdoers will bargain for releases. It thus constitutes the
minimum acceptable rule in private actions affected with a public
interest. But a stricter state rule that required, for instance, the
actual naming of the parties on whom the release would operate
would not offend any federal policy interest. The Court in Zenith
82
should therefore have simply vetoed the unacceptable state rule.
Against this background stands Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford
Motor Co. 83 At issue was whether the language of a general release
was sufficiently broad to bar an antitrust claim. 84 The Third Circuit initially established its competence to choose a rule of decision 8 5 (Clearfield'sfirst balancing test 6), its option to adopt state
law as the rule of decision 87 (Clearfield's second balancing test 8 8),
and the need to balance state against federal interests. 89 The court
observed that state law customarily governs contracts, such as releases, 90 and found no federal interest in nationally uniform rules
of decision. 91 Turning to the effect of state law on federal policy,
the court pinpointed the policy at stake: the "private cause of action as a supplemental means for the enforcement of the antitrust
laws. '' 92 Determining that neither releases in general 9 3 nor the applicable state law on releases 94 contravened that policy, the court
concluded that state rules of decision should govern. 95 In so doing,
however, the court intimated that, in an appropriate case, federal
policy would justify a limited veto of a state rule of decision: "[a]
federal court would still be permitted . . . to reject the rule of a
particular state whose doctrine on the interpretation of releases is
'96
not entirely consistent with federal antitrust objectives.
81 401 U.S. at 346.
82 See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
83 522 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1975) (Forman, J.).
84
d. at 888.
85
Id. at 888-89.
88 See notes 39-45 and accompanying text supra.
87 522 F.2d at 889.
88

See notes 39-45 and accompanying text supra.

89 522 F.2d at 889-90.
98

Id. at 891.
91 Id. at 890-91.
92Id. at 891. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
93 522 F.2d at 891-92.
94 Id. at 892.
95 Id.
96Id.

1978]

DISPLACING STATE RULES OF DECISION

353

CONCLUSION

Releases of federal claims occupy a region between exclusively
state and exclusively federal concerns. When federal courts exercise their power to formulate rules of decision for such releases,
constitutional federalism should serve as the fulcrum in balancing
state against federal interests. Respect for state interests requires
federal courts to minimize the displacement of state rules of decision. Promoting federal policy necessitates the limited judicial veto
of state rules of decision that are incompatible with the federal policy at stake. In contrast, the imposition of nationally uniform rules
of decision requires, by definition, expansive application of federal common law. Courts should therefore give effect to only the
most urgent need for national uniformity.
Daniel C. Cohn

